Since the eruption of war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, China has been engaged in active diplomacy to position itself as an indispensable mediator. Given China’s role in helping to normalize relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia earlier this year, expectations are high that Beijing can deliver again.
So far, China has little to show for its efforts in Gaza, which shouldn’t come as a surprise. Why, then, does Beijing remain committed to negotiation?
There are at least three reasons for China’s continued engagement. First, Chinese leaders want to be seen as relevant in the Middle East. As China builds and consolidates its image as a responsible stakeholder and great power, being absent from attempts to solve crises, especially of this scale, is simply unimaginable.
China is rapidly diversifying its economic relations and strengthening political ties in the region, especially with Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Although China is not yet a security provider like the United States, it endeavors to become one. A stated policy goal of President Xi Jinping is to elevate China’s involvement in regional security and political affairs and to anchor China as a key geopolitical force.
Second, the Gaza crisis is an opportunity for China to advance its position and relationship with Arab and Islamic states, most importantly by supporting Palestine. This was China’s default position throughout most of the Cold War, and it continues to buy China goodwill among Arab allies.
Third, long before the Gaza crisis, China proposed a new security architecture in the Middle East, a manifestation of Xi’s so-called Global Security Initiative (GSI). Specifically, the GSI would be based on a new security concept that is collective, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable; be led by Middle Eastern countries; follow the UN Charter and principles; and be implemented through regional security dialogues.
The essence of the GSI is an alternative vision for regional and global security that differs from the norm created by the West and led by the US. Instead of being based on shared democratic values and dichotomous camps, security would be based on accommodation, negotiation, and co-existence.
This concept of accommodation forms the foundation of China’s position vis-à-vis Israel-Palestine, and is characterized by the two-state solution and shared development.
Finally, succeeding where the US has failed has become a top priority for China’s diplomats. For instance, China has engaged the Taliban regime in Afghanistan ever since the US withdrew in August 2021. Beijing wants to promote economic cooperation and moderate the Taliban’s domestic policy.
Similarly, China has been advocating for the international community to consider the “legitimate security concerns” of Russia and Iran.
In all three countries, China recognizes that succeeding Washington’s failures with success would strengthen its model for security, and the clout of its leadership.
Yet partnering with America’s foes plays to China’s strengths. Wooing Israelis and Palestinians to the table will be far more difficult. If China truly wants to mediate the Gaza crisis, it will first need to address its evident lack of neutrality. Beijing has repeatedly stated that it “sides with Arab and Islamic countries” in this disagreement.
Neutrality isn’t a precondition for successful mediation, but impartiality is. With China’s biased stance, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for Israel to get on board.
Furthermore, China’s influence over the decision-making of both Israel and Palestine – and its ability to persuade either side to adopt a position that may be misaligned with its national interests – is limited. China doesn’t hold critical leverage over either side (especially Hamas), nor is China likely to mobilize major resources to incentivize a truce.
To be sure, China has been busy since Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel. Chinese special envoy for Middle East affairs, Zhai Jun, has traveled to Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain for ceasefire talks, while Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with an Arab-Islamic ministerial delegation last month to affirm China’s support to Arab and Islamic countries.
Despite the shuttle diplomacy, however, China’s expectations appear moderate. While Beijing is too invested to stay on the sidelines, it certainly doesn’t bear the illusion that it can solve the crisis alone.
Ironically, that may be enough to move the needle. Realistic expectations and careful diplomacy could pave the way for more ambitious and effective solutions down the road.
Yun Sun is director of the China program and co-director of the East Asia program at the Stimson Center in Washington.
